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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
1950 amendment seems to taboo vertical integration in support of the
instant case.21
The holding, however, that the action may accrue at anytime after the
acquisition is not so easily reconciled. Although laches will not apply
against the government, 22 equity courts should be reluctant to frame a
decree against one whose only offense was innocently making an extra-
ordinarily good investment forty years ago. In view of the multitude of
other similarly innocent acquisitions since 1914, great force is lent to
that argument.
That it was unforeseeable, however, that the DuPont-GM marriage
of 1917-19 would be annulled in 1957 is no longer of practical concern.
What counsel is to advise his clients as to future stock acquisitions and
mergers is far more important - yet it remains a matter for clairvoyance.
No certain test for determining the validity of stock acquisitions is
provided by the court. The court implies that the measure of substantial
restraint should be a quantitative one, yet it leaves to speculation the
method of determining what quantity is substantial. Thus ambiguity
remains the rule and the resulting confusion falls prey to Justice Jack-
son's comment that "if there is one thing that the people are entitled to
expect from their law makers, it is rules of law that will enable indi-
viduals to tell whether they are married and if so to whom."23
HAROLD FRIEDMAN
PAROLE REVOCATION - RIGHT TO HEARING
Petitioner had been paroled while serving a one to fifteen year
sentence for attempted burglary. Prior to the expiration of his maximum
term and 'before final release, his parole was revoked, and he was taken
into custody. The petitioner instituted habeas corpus proceedings in an
Ohio court of appeals stating that he had not been given any notice or
knowledge of any alleged violation of the conditions of his parole, and
further, that any finding that there had been such violation would be
arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. The court of appeals dismissed the
petition and ordered that petitioner be remanded to the custody of the
sheriff. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this decision.'
The Ohio courts were faced with the question of whether a convicted
person, who is legally outside the prison walls by virtue of a parole, is
I See note 7 supra.
'In United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, (E.D. Penn. 1943) the action
was heard forty-three years after the acquisitions.
'Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1947).
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entitled, -by the laws of Ohio and the Federal Constitutitution, to notice
and hearing before revocation of such parole.
There are two questions to be answered in determining if notice and
hearing are requisites for a valid parole revocation. First, is such pro-
cedure embraced within state or federal constitutional guarantees of due
process? Secondly, if the answer to the first question is in the negative,
is such procedure required by the pertinent statutory provisions?
The Ohio Supreme Court approached the constitutional question by
analogizing the position of the parolee to that of the probationer.F He
is merely a felon at large by the sovereign grace. During the process by
which he had been relieved of his freedom the constitutional safeguards
which form the protective bulwark around the individual citizen's liber-
ties had been followed,3 and are not again available to him because he
is still a "convict" and has not yet been re-endowed with that status
classified as "citizen." This reasoning is supported by the definitions of
parole4 and convict5 as set forth in the Ohio Revised Code.
Not all jurisdictions arrive at the same decision the Ohio court did
on this constitutional question.6 Many of the courts which arrive at the
'In re Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1957).
'Id. at 343, 142 N.E.2d at 849. The Ohio Supreme Court quoted Mr. Justice
Cardozo's statement in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Escoe v.
Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1934): "Probation or suspension of sentence comes as
an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions
in respect of its duration as Congress may impose."
'Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); Ex parle Levi, 39 Cal.2d 41, 244
P.2d 403 (1952); 1-n re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 146 Pac. 1009 (1915); Guy v.
Utecht, 216 Minn. 255, 12 N.W.2d 753 (1943).
' OHIo REV. CoDB § 2965.01 (E). "Parole means the release from confinement in
any state penal or reformatory institution, by the pardon and parole commission upon
such terms as the commission prescribes. A prisoner on parole is in the legal custody
of the department of mental hygiene and correction, and under the control of the
commission."
'OHio RE. CODE § 2965.01 (G). "Convict means a person who has been con-
victed of a felony under the laws of this state, whether or not actually confined in a
state penal or reformatory institution, unless he has been pardoned or has served
his sentence."
*Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 S.2d 607 (1947) Dictum to the effect that not to
allow habeas corpus would be a violation of due process; People ex 7el. Joyce v.
Strassheim, 242 M11. 359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909) The appropriate statute allowed a
hearing and as such the statute did not deprive the party of his liberty without due
process as it would have done had he not been entitled to a hearing; State ex rel.
Murray v. Swenson, 196 Md. 222, 76 A.2d (1950). The decision was based on
the fact that the Common Law required a hearing; Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433,
168 Pac. 713 (1917). A suspended sentence gives the right to liberty, which is one
of the highest rights of citizenship. This right can not be taken from a person with-
out notice and an opportunity to be heard without invading his constitutional rights.
State v. Renew, 136 S.C. 302, 132 S.E. 613 (1928) quoted the Lucero case; State
v. O'Neal, 147 Wash, 169, 265 Pac. 175 (1928) quoted the Lucero case.
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opposite result base their conclusion on the fact that the conditionally
freed individual is entitled to his freedom, and, as such, is possessed of
a right which can only be forfeited by breaching the condition of its
grant. Forfeiture without the opportunity for a hearing is then deemed
to be in violation of constitutionally guaranteed due process.
7
After the Ohio court decided it was within the power of the legisla-
ture to dispense with notice and hearing to accomplish such revocation,
the court had to determine whether the applicable statutes nevertheless
required notice and hearing. The applicable sections of the Ohio Re-
vised Code8 contain no express provision as to notice and hearing.
Statutes not expressly requiring or dispensing with notice and hearing
have been interpreted in accord with the particular jurisdiction's deter-
mination of the applicability of the due process requirement.9 The Ohio
court held that the pertinent statutory provisions dearly indicated a legis-
lative intent not to burden the parole process with such hearings. This
seems evident 'by the court's comparison of the parolee to a "trusty"
who is granted the privilege of leaving the confines of the penal insti-
tuition, but is still, while enjoying that privilege, within -the legal custody
and under the control of the head of the institution.
The view adopted by the Ohio court is supported -by several practical
considerations. Because of the widespread fear of testifying publicly
against a paroled convict, parole authorities are greatly dependent upon
secret investigations, the benefit of which would be lost in the type of
7Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941) (conditional pardon). It
is interesting to note that the U.S. Circuit Court based its decision on Escoe v. Zerbst,
295 U.S. 490, apparently construing Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in this U.S.
Supreme Court case as referring to the constitutional issue rather than the interpreta-
tion to be placed upon the construction of the federal statute. This, in spite of
Justice Cardozo's declaration at page 492: "... we do no accept the petitioner's con-
tention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute."
At least one jurisdiction does not extend the constitutional guarantee to all forms of
conditional freedom. Compare Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596, 63 S.E.2d 402 (1951)
(Notice and hearing required to revoke suspended sentence); Gross v. Huff, 208
Ga. 392, 67 S.E.2d 124 (1951) (Notice and hearing required to revoke probation
sentence); with Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937) (Notice and
hearing not required to revoke parole).
8 OHio Rnv. CODE §§ 2965.09, 2965.17, 2965.18, 2965.20, 2965.21, 2965.23.
'People ex tel. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909) A hearing
required before the board of pardons on the question of whether the parole had been
violated on the grounds that the constitutional guarantee of due process of law en-
tided him to a hearing. Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937) A
hearing was not required because that statute by its express terms states that a parolee
remains within the legal custody and control of the prison commission. A plain and
clear abuse, if decision arrived at fraudulently, corruptly, or by mere personal caprice,
was here, however, said to be subject to habeas corpus that such action might be
reviewed.
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